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I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Nature of the Case
This case involves determination of the property rights of coterminous owners of real
property. The Appellant, the East Side Highway District (“District”), owns certain real property
in Kootenai County adjacent to Coeur d’Alene Lake known as Boothe Park over which a public
road known as Boothe Parke Road crosses and terminates at the shores of Lake Coeur d’Alene.
The park portion of the parcel is used by the public for picnicking, swimming, and recreating.
Boothe Park Road is used for accessing the park and launching boats into Coeur d’Alene Lake.
The Respondents, Gregory Delavan and Ellen Delavan (“the Delavans”), own the adjacent parcel
of property south of Boothe Park Road which includes their residence and a commercial marina
they operate.
The District contends a chain link fence that was first documented by a surveyor in 1956
as existing along a portion of the southern boundary of the public road now known as Boothe Park
Road (which has a concrete boat ramp into Coeur d’Alene Lake at its terminus) comprises the
common boundary between the District’s parcel to the north and the Delavans’ adjoining parcel to
the south. The District also contends that if any portion of Boothe Park Road lies upon any portion
of real property owned by the Delavans that the District has a public road over and across the
property pursuant to the provisions of I.C. § 40-202(3).
Gregory Delavan and Ellen Delavan contend the deeds by which they and their
predecessors acquired property guaranteed them a parcel that included one hundred feet of water
front. The Delavans also claimed the concrete boat was installed and used with their permission,
and therefore no public road was established pursuant to I.C. § 40-202(3).
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The district court held the District failed to meet its burden of proof to establish either of
the two elements of a boundary by agreement or acquiescence. The district court also held a 1949
deed from John Boothe and Gertrude Boothe conveying a parcel of real property to Oliver Delavan
and Edna Delavan which called out a county road as a boundary was latently ambiguous because
the district court was unable to determine from the evidence at trial where the county road existed
in 1949. The district court held it was the intent of the Boothes to convey adequate property to
assure the Delavans acquired an additional one hundred feet of water frontage. The district court
also held any portion of Boothe Park Road lying within the boundaries of the property it decreed
belonged to the Delavans was not a public road because the District failed to establish the necessary
element of public use under an adverse and hostile claim of right. The District appeals district
court’s final decree.
B.

Course of the Proceedings

On April 24, 2012, the District filed its complaint for quiet title and declaratory judgment
against the Delavans seeking a declaration that Boothe Park Road to its terminus at a concrete boat
ramp on the shores of Lake Coeur d’Alene was a public right-of-way and seeking an order
requiring removal of a retaining wall encroachment constructed within the right-of-way by
Gregory Delavan and Ellen Delavan. The District also sought entry of an order that the location
of a chain link fence which was constructed along the easterly and southerly right-of-way of
Boothe Park Road was the common boundary between the District’s parcel and the Delavan’s
parcel, consistent with a 1956 boundary survey prepared by Ray Kindler. R pp. 14-18.
On May 14, 2012, the Delavans filed a Notice of Appearance. R pp. 89-90. On June 26,
2016, the District filed a Ten Day Notice of Intent to Take Default. R pp. 91-92. On July 13,
2012, the Delavans answered, raised affirmative defenses and interposed a counterclaim alleging
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trespass, quiet title, and declaratory relief, and seeking a decree that the Delavans held all right,
title, and interest to the properties described in Kootenai County Instrument Nos. 186406 and
224726 free of any claims of the District. R pp. 19-27. On February 6, 2013, the District answered
the Delavans’ counterclaim. R pp. 28-31.
On October 21, 2014, the District filed a motion for partial summary judgment, supported
by the affidavits of John Pankratz and the District’s attorney, as well as a supporting memorandum,
seeking partial summary judgment that on its I.C. § 40-202(3) claim to a public road. R pp. 173306. On November 5, 2014, the Delavans opposed the motion of partial summary judgment with
the declarations of Gregory Delavan, Ernest Warner and their counsel (which submitted the
deposition testimony of Jack Delavan), and an opposition brief. R pp. 309-386. The District filed
its reply brief in support of the partial summary judgment on November 12, 2014. R pp. 387-395.
On December 2, 2014, the Delavans filed the additional declaration of Jim Brady in opposition to
the summary judgment. R pp. 428-434.
On November 12, 2014, the District moved to strike portions of Gregory Delavan’s, Ernest
Warner’s and Jack Delavan’s testimony. R pp. 396-399. On November 18, 2014, the Delavans
filed an Amended Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion to Strike. R pp. 401-411.1 A
reply in support of the motion to strike was filed by the District on November 28, 2014. R pp.
423-427. The district court issued its Order Re: Plaintiff’s Motion to Strike Portions of Declaration
Testimony of Gregory Delavan, Jack Delavan and Ernest Warner on December 11, 2014. R pp.
437-438. The district court struck the hearsay portions of Jack Delavan’s deposition testimony
regarding testimony of what Jack’s father, Oliver, allegedly told Jack. Id.

The initial opposition memorandum filed November 18, 2014 mistakenly identified the District’s attorney as the
source of the opposition memorandum. R pp. 412-422.
1
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The partial summary judgment was heard on December 9, 2014. R p. 439. The district
court issued its Order Denying Plaintiff’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on December 15,
2014. R pp. 439-440.
On January 15, 2015, the District filed a motion in limine regarding the elements of the
District’s prescriptive claim; and a motion for separate trials on the boundary by agreement and
other issues. R. p. 441-458. On May 22, 2015, the parties entered into a stipulation to bifurcate
the trial and try only the boundary by agreement issue in the first phase. R pp. 503-504. On June
5, 2015, the Delavans filed a memorandum regarding the bifurcated trial joining in the motion. R
pp. 507-509. The matter was heard June 9, 2015, and the district court entered an order separating
the boundary by agreement trial from the remaining issues for trial. R pp. 510-511.
On November 4, 2015, the Plaintiff and the Defendants each filed their exhibit and witness
lists. R pp. 520-540. A three-day trial on the boundary by agreement commenced November 16,
2015. Tr Vol. I, p. 2.
An objection to designated portions of Jack Delavan’s deposition testimony was filed on
November 17, 2015. R pp. 575-618. On November 19, 2015, the Delavans filed their response.
R pp. 616-622. On December 1, 2015, the district court issued its Order RE: Objections to
Deposition Testimony of Jack Delavan excluding certain portions of Jack Delavan’s deposition
containing hearsay statements. R pp. 623-625.
On November 19, 2015, the district court issued an Order Setting Schedule for Submission
of Closing Arguments. R pp. 614-615. On January 11, 2016, plaintiff filed its post-trial closing
argument. R pp. 632-660. On February 8, 2016, the Delavans filed their post-trial response brief.
R pp. 672-724. On February 22, 2018, the District filed its post-trial reply brief. R pp. 729-757.
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On March 28, 2016, the district court issued its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and
Verdict. R pp. 767-769. The district court held “Plaintiff has failed to prove, even by a
preponderance of the evidence, either required element of a boundary by an agreement: 1) an
uncertain or disputed boundary, and 2) a subsequent agreement fixing the boundary.” Id. The
district court also held “[u]se of the boat launch by all parties other than Defendants or their
predecessors in interest, since its construction, has been permissive.” Id.
On May 16, 2016, the Delavans filed a motion for partial summary judgment supported by
a memorandum and a declaration of counsel. R pp. 774-825. On June 15, 2016, a corrective
declaration of John F. Magnuson was filed in support of the motion for partial summary judgment.
R pp. 828-830. On June 16, 2018, the declaration of Kenneth E. Dingman, Jr. was filed in
opposition to the Delavan’s motion for summary judgment, as well as an opposition memorandum.
R pp. 831-845. The Delavans filed their reply memorandum in support of the partial summary
judgment on June 23, 2016. R pp. 846-851. On July 11, 2016, the Court entered its Memorandum
Decision and Order Granting Defendants’ Motion for Partial Summary Judgment holding:
“Because use of the boat ramp has always been permissive, and because as a matter of law Plaintiff
must demonstrate that its claim was hostile or adverse Defendants’ Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment is granted.” R pp. 853-860.
On September 6, 2016, the Delavans moved for entry of judgment. R pp. 861-876. The
District filed its opposition memorandum on September 14, 2016. R pp. 879-884. A reply
memorandum in support of the Delavan’s motion was filed on September 15, 2016. R pp. 885890. On November 21, 2016, the district court entered its Order denying Delavan’s Motion for
Entry of Judgment because it had not ruled on the exact boundaries of the property conveyed by
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the 1949 deed from Boothe to the Delavans or the location or extent of Boothe Park Road as it
existed in 1910 or 1949. R pp. 893-895.
The district court scheduled the second phase of trial. R p. 897. The District filed its Phase
Two witness and exhibit list on May 5, 2017, as did the Delavans. R pp. 904-912. The District
also filed another motion in limine regarding Phase Two of Trial. R pp. 954-958.
Trial commenced on May 15, 2017. Tr Vol. II, p. 2. Trial concluded on May 16, 2017.
Id. On June 20, 2017, the district court entered its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and
Verdict. (The clerk failed to include this document in the augmented record, and a motion was
made in the present appeal to augment the record to include this document. If granted, it will be
designated AR 1-7.) (Also, a copy of the district court’s verdict was included as an exhibit to a
declaration of the Delavan’s counsel and is in the record on appeal. R pp. 1002-1008.) On
September 12, 2017, the district court entered its judgment. R pp. 32-35.
On September 26, 2017, the District filed a Motion to Alter or Amend the Final Judgment
together with a supporting memorandum. R pp. 970-977. On November 15, 2017, the Delavans
filed their Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion to Alter or Amend the Final Judgment
supported by the declaration of their counsel. R pp. 986-1029. On November 30, 2017, the District
filed its reply memorandum in support of their motion to alter or amend the final judgment. R pp.
1039-1042. On December 8, 2017, the district court entered its Order Re: Plaintiff’s Motion to
Alter or Amend Judgment. R pp. 1045-1046.
On September 25, 2017, the Delavans filed its memorandum of costs and supporting
affidavit. R pp. 960-969. On October 6, 2017, the District filed its objection to the Delavan’s
memorandum of costs. R pp. 980-983. On November 15, 2017, the Delavans filed their reply
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memorandum in opposition to the District’s objection to the memorandum of costs. R pp. 10301038.
On December 8, 2017, the district court entered an Amended Judgment. R pp. 43-46. On
January 19, 2018, a stipulation for entry of a second amended judgment was filed to correct a
scrivener’s error because the legal description inadvertently omitted the applicable range (i.e.
Range 3 West) in the legal description. R pp. 1047-1053. On January 25, 2018, a Second
Amended Judgment was filed. R pp. 61-64.
On October 24, 2017, the District filed its Notice of Appeal. R pp. 36-42. On December
12, 2017, an Amended Notice of Appeal was filed. R pp. 47-51. 3. On December 15, 2017, a
Second Amended Notice of Appeal was filed. R pp. 54-60. On January 29, 2018, a Third Amended
Notice of Appeal was filed. R pp. 65-70. On January 29, 2018, a Fourth Amended Notice of
Appeal was filed. R pp. 71-77.
On March 15, 2018, the District objected to the Clerk’s lodged record because it only
contained a few of the pleadings even though a can of the entire district court file was requested
on appeal. R pp. 1058-1059. On April 9, 2018, the Delavans stipulated to entry of an order to
augment the clerk’s record. R pp. 1062. On April 10, 2018, the district court entered an order
requiring the clerk to augment the appeal record. R pp. 1064-1065.
C.

Concise Statement of Facts
1.

Transcripts on Appeal

There are two transcripts on appeal. They are not designated as Volume I and Volume II
and use the same page numbers. The first transcript is for the three-day trial occurring November
16, 2015, through November 18, 2015. To avoid confusion, references to this transcript in this
appeal will identify this transcript as Volume I. The other transcript is for the two-day trial
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occurring May 15, 2017, through May 16, 2017. References to this transcript in the brief will
identify it as Volume II. Both transcripts contain the Supreme Court docket number. However,
the Kootenai County case number designations are incorrect because they identify the underlying
case number as CR-2012-3131. The correct underlying Kootenai County case number designation
is CV-2012-3131.
2.

Creation of the Lakeshore Addition to Sunnyside Subdivision

On July 25, 1910, Fred L. Tiffany, Josua Petersen and John W. Boothe subdivided land
lying within Section 33, Township to North, Range 3 West of the Bose Meridian, Kootenai County,
Idaho. Trial Exhibit 1. The subdivision was named the Lakeshore Addition to Sunnyside
(“Lakeshore Addition”). Id. The highways depicted within the subdivision were dedicated to the
public. Id. There were 38 water front lots depicted on the plat. Id. There also was an unnumbered
space between Lot 18 and Lot 19. Id.
3.

Misnumbering of Lots in Lakeshore Addition

A historic account of the Lakeshore Addition and Boothe Park prepared by Kootenai
County surveyor Bruce Anderson identified a warranty deed from John W. Boothe to Fechner in
1940 which conveyed: “All that portion of Lots Thirty-two (32) and Thirty-three (33) of Lakeshore
Addition to Sunnyside...according to the recorded plat thereof, ...being designated upon the
official map of said highway as Lots Thirty-three (33) and Thirty-four (34) and lying North
and East of Lot Thirty-four 34 (highway map Lot 35) of said addition...”. R p. 111, Exhibit 28
(page 5 of 18); Tr Vol. II, p. 256, L. 13 – p. 257, L. 21. In this 1940 deed, Boothe identified the
correct lots as platted and identified the highway map as containing incorrect lot numbering Tr
Vol. II p. 289, L. 7 – p. 290, L. 23. However, the 1940 highway map did not legally alter the
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recorded plat. Tr Vol. II, p. 164, L. 16 – p. 165, L. 25. The plat itself has never been amended.
Tr Vol. II, p. 283, Ll. 2-11.
On February 15, 1955, Ray Kindler, a surveyor, prepared a survey of lots 26-30 of the
Lakeshore Addition, which were located south of the Delavans’ property. Trial Exhibits 10 and
55. In this survey, Kindler indicated:
The above survey was based on previous surveys of Wm. Ashley, made in 1940,
1943, 1950 and are on file at the County Auditors [sic] Office. The lot numbers on
the above plat do not correspond with the original plat of this sub-division or the
records of the Bureau of Highways, however they conform to Ashley’s survey and
to numbers that the present owners use. Mr. John Boothe one of the original plattors
stated that an error of 100 feet had been made in locating one of the lots and that
this accounts for the difference in lot numbers.
Id.
Thus, it was identified in 1955 by Kindler that a previous surveyor (Ashley) used the wrong lot
numbers in several of his surveys and Kindler continued the use of the incorrect lot numbers in his
survey because they conformed with the designation on Ashley’s survey and the lot numbers used
by the owners of the lots Kindler surveyed. Id. Who first made the initial mistake of using an
incorrect lot number when identifying a lot is unknown.
Sometime in 1995, Jim Meckel with Meckel Engineering and Surveying, who was doing
survey work for the Delavans, alerted the Kootenai County assessor’s office of a lot numbering
discrepancy in the Lakeshore Addition by providing a copy of a letter he had sent to attorney
Michael Reagan regarding the Delavans’ ownership of an area north of Lot 19 deeded to Oliver
Delevan and Edna Delevan by the Boothes (discussed below). Tr Vol. I, p. 205, L. 24 – p. 206, L.
15; Exhibit 18 (p. 75-76 of 583). Kootenai County assessor Mike McDowell expressed the opinion
at trial that Meckel was one of the best surveyors of his time. Tr Vol. I, p. 205, L. 24 – p. 206, L.
15. This letter informed Reagan that Meckel had discerned a problem with incorrect lot numbers
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being used by the landowners in conveyances but indicated it did not invalidate the metes and
bounds description used by Boothe in the 1949 deed to Oliver and Edna. Id.
On October 23, 1995, a memorandum was sent from Joe Johns in the county assessor’s
office to county surveyor Bruce Anderson expressing confusion on how to proceed with the “new”
lot numbers based upon the information provided by Meckel.

Exhibit 18 (p. 73 of 583).

McDowell, the Kootenai County assessor, testified this memorandum was the basis for later
adjusting the assessed value of the Delavan property. Tr Vol. I, p. 205, Ll. 8-23.
The assessor’s file also contained a letter from Kootenai County surveyor Anderson dated
March 12, 1996, addressed to landowners informing them in the course of researching recorded
deeds in Boothe’s Addition [sic] for Kootenai County’s Parks and Waterways Division it had been
discovered there was a lot numbering discrepancy. Trial Exhibit 18 (p. 65 of 583). Anderson
expressed the opinion the incorrect numbering resulted from the metes and bounds sale from the
Boothes to Oliver and Gertrude. Id. On May 6, 1996, Dave Williamson, Mapping Supervisor,
prepared a memorandum to the assessor’s file which indicated survey information revealed lots
lying south of Boothe Park had been referenced in subsequent deeds using re-numbered lot
descriptions arising from the metes and bounds parcel conveyed by the Boothes to Oliver and
Edna. Exhibit 18, pages 49-50 of 583.2
There are no missing lots in the Lakeshore Addition. At trial, Geremy Russell, a licensed
Idaho surveyor who is the survey manager for J-U-B Engineers testified. Tr Vol. II, p. 74, L. 12
– p. 75, L. 19. Russell testified as part of preparing to testify regarding the Lakeshore Addition
subdivision, he directed his survey staff in certain field work. Tr Vol. II, p. 93, Ll. 11-23. The

The District does not agree with the assessor’s conclusion that the 1949 deed from the Boothes to Oliver and Edna
was the first appearance of incorrect lot numbers in deeds. The Boothes’ deed used a metes and bounds description.
Other evidence in the record reveals the first known misnumbering occurred in 1940.
2
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purpose of the field work was to ascertain that the lots contained in the Lakeshore Addition plat
actually existed as originally platted. Id; Vol. II, p. 94, L. 24 – p. 95, L. 4. Besides the field work
he did to support his testimony, Russell also reviewed numerous past surveys of the area in
reaching his expert opinion that the lots existed as platted. Tr Vol. II, p. 95, Ll. 5-7.
Russell’s review of Kindler’s 1955 survey and other surveys and monuments led him to
conclude incorrect lot numbers were being used for the lots originating somewhere around Lots
36 and 37. Tr Vol. II, p. 95, L. 8 – p. 98, L. 18. The lot actually occupied by the landowner was
off by one lot number from the description in the owner’s conveyance deed. Id. Despite the
confusion of surveyor Ashley and some of the property owners regarding the proper lot number,
Russell testified the subdivided lots that were platted existed and remained true to the Lakeshore
Addition as platted. Tr Vol. II, p. 98, Ll. 19-22; p. 108, Ll. 1-3. In other words, the issue was not
whether the lots existed as platted. Rather, some legal descriptions did not match the ground
occupied by the owner. Id.
4.

Oliver Delavan and Edna Delavan Acquire Property in Lakeshore
Addition

Three generations of the Delavan family are involved in the property discussed in this this
suit. Oliver Delavan and Edna Delavan are the first generation and are the parents to Jack Delavan
and Frank Delavan. Tr Vol. I, p. 463, Ll. 19-24; AR-11, J. Delavan Dep. Tr. p. 10, Ll. 15-17; p.
36, Ll. 6-13. Gregory Delavan is Jack Delavan’s son and Oliver’s grandson. Id. For the sake of
clarity, the Delavans’ first names are used in this brief.
On May 31, 1945, Louis Wasmer executed a warranty deed conveying to Oliver and Edna
Lots 19, 20, 21 and 22 according to the plat of the Lakeshore Addition to Sunnyside. Trial
Exhibit 2. The deed was recorded June 18, 1946, as Instrument No. 186406. Id. The Boothes
were not involved in this title transfer. Id; Tr p. 334, L. 22 – p. 335, L. 11. The lots described in
11

the Wasmer deed to Oliver and Edna are depicted below (the top of the illustration is oriented to
the north)3:

(Trial Exhibit 1.)
Oliver and Edna never sought legal recourse against Wasmer or anyone else to reform his deed or
correct any alleged title defect arising from the Wasmer deed. Tr Vol. II, p. 168, L. 9 – p. 169, L.
5; p. 377, L. 7 – p. 378, L. 11.
On August 17, 1949, John W. Boothe and Gertrude Boothe, husband and wife, transferred
Oliver and Edna additional real property north of Lot 19 by a quit claim deed recorded as
Instrument No. 224726, records of Kootenai County, Idaho, containing a metes and bounds
description which read as follows:
Commencing at the Northwest corner of Lot 19, as originally platted, Lakeshore
addition to Sunnyside, section, [sic] 33, Twp 50 North, Range 3 W B M thence
North 79°58’ East to the West boundary of the existing county road; thence along
the existing right of way line of said county road to its intersection with the meander
line of Lake Coeurd’Alene [sic]; thence Southerly along the meander line of said
The original plat does not include a compass rose with the cardinal directions for north, south, east and west.
However, other maps in the record provide this information. See Trial Exhibits 9, 10 17, and 21.
3
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Lake Coeur d’Alene, to t he [sic] point of beginning, said land being in the county
of Kootenai, State of Idaho.
Trial Exhibit 3.
At the time of execution of this metes and bounds deed to Oliver and Edna, John Boothe was aware
some owners were using incorrect lot numbers in conveyances. Tr Vol. II p. 166, L. 19 – p. 168,
L. 8; p. 289, L. 7 – p. 290, L. 23.
This deed was recorded August 17, 1949. Id. At trial, Kootenai County Assessor Mike
McDowell testified Oliver and Edna built a home on their property in 1949. Tr Vol. I, p. 196, ll.
15-23.
Kootenai County assessor Mike McDowell testified it wasn’t until 1996 that his office
discovered the county had mislabeled the 1949 metes and bounds parcel as Lot 19. Tr Vol. I, p.
224, L. 20 – p. 225, L. 16; p. 239, L. 15 – p. 241, L. 7; p. 246, L. 24 – p. 247, L. 5.. This was
brought to the assessor’s attention by James (Jim) Meckel of Meckel Engineering in 1995. Id.
5.

The 1949 Existing County Road (Boothe Park Road)

The District’s surveyor at trial, Geremy Russell, testified he does not know where the
county road existed in 1949, but the best indication is the plat, which is harmonious with how the
road exists today and very consistent with the plat. Tr Vol. I, p. 386, L. 17 – p. 387, L. 24; Tr Vol.
II, p. 149, Ll. 4-13; p. 173, Ll. 1—10; Exhibit AAA. Russell also testified he found no evidence
the road existed in a different location in 1949 than today. Tr Vol. II, p. 116, L. 22- p. 117, L. 21.
The Delavans’ surveyor, Ernest Warner, testified he did not know where the existing county road
was located in 1949. Tr Vol. II, p. 32, Ll. 8-12. Warner testified the existing public road today is
similar to the plat. Tr Vol. II, p. 337, Ll. 21-24. Gregory Delavan was born in 1953. Tr Vol. I, p.
465, Ll. 11-12. Gregory was allowed to testify, over objection, that the existing county road ended
at Oliver’s driveway in 1949. Tr Vol. I, p. 497 L. 25 – p. 502. L. 14. Gregory testified the county
13

plowed the public road, plowed Oliver’s private driveway and turned the plow around south on
Oliver’s property (in the vicinity of where another home exists today). Tr Vol. II, p. 237, L. 4 –
p. 239, L. 17.
An aerial photograph from 1951, although grainy, shows an area consistent with a driveway
from Oliver and Edna’s property to the public road. Exhibit AAA. A current picture of the
intersection of the Delavan driveway with the public road can be found at Exhibit 38.
Marilyn Moore testified at trial regarding her personal knowledge of the existing county
road in 1949. Moore was born in 1936. Tr Vol. II, p. 376, Ll. 17-25. Moore is the granddaughter
of John Boothe and Gertrude Boothe. Tr Vol. II, p. 377, Ll. 17-20. Moore’s parents had a cabin
on the bench just above Boothe Park (which was eradicated due to highway construction through
the area.) Tr Vol. II, p. 378, Ll. 1-13. Moore visited the area where the park now exists beginning
when she was a preschooler and it was just property her grandfather owned. Tr Vol. II, p. 378, L.
14 – p. 379 L. 6. She visited it at least 30 to 40 times between the time she was a preschooler until
she was 20. Tr Vol. II, p. 379, Ll. 7-11.
Moore testified she had most recently visited Boothe Park in the fall before the first phase
of the trial in this matter (which was held November 2015). Tr Vol. II, p. 379, Ll. 14-25. Moore
testified Boothe Park Road as she last viewed it in 2015 exists to the boat launch the same as it did
in 1949. Tr Vol. II, p. 380, L. 25 – p. 381, L. 24; p. 383, Ll. 15-18.
Today, a concrete boat ramp resides at the terminus of Boothe Park Road. Tr Vol. I, p. 92,
L. 25 – p. 93, L. 20, Exhibit VVV. The installation of the concrete boat launch was documented
in a January 29, 1955, news article in the Coeur d’Alene Press, stating “Work Gets Underway on
New ‘Boothe Public Park’ East of CD’A”. Trial Exhibit 6. The article included pictures of a
concrete boat ramp being installed by the District. Id. The article informed the public that the

14

property was donated by “John W. Boothe, pioneer Coeur d’Alene resident and realtor”. Id. The
article reported the District crew had installed a sixty foot by twelve foot concrete slab as the ramp
for a boat loading and unloading area and the greater portion of the property would be available
for use as picnic grounds. Id. The February 15, 1955, minutes of the District indicate signs for
the park were ordered for placement at the entrance to the park off Road (Highway) No. 10 and
immediately within the park. Trial Exhibit 7.
Before the installation of the concrete boat ramp, Jack testified fishermen used Boothe Park
Road to get to the launch area to launch their boats, which was located where the boat ramp is
today. AR-19, J. Delavan Dep. Tr. p. 43, L. 18 – p. 44, L. 8. Patrick Seale, a neighbor to Oliver,
testified he met Oliver in 1982 or 1983. Tr Vol. I, p. 448, Ll. 14-17. At the time, Oliver was
removing debris from the boat ramp. Tr Vol. I, p. 449, ll. 8-13. Over objection, Seale was allowed
to testify to hearsay statements about what Oliver told him regarding Oliver’s claimed ownership
of the ramp area. Tr Vol. I, pp. 449, L. 20 – P. 454, L. 13. In cross examination, Seale indicated
Oliver told him Boothe Park was just a jungle when he bought, but there was road that went down
to the lake where he could launch boats, and he characterized it as a mud hole. Tr Vol. I, p. 461,
L. 1 – p. 462, L. 7. Seale also testified that Oliver told him that he allowed a few of his fishermen
friends to launch their boats there too. Id. Gregory Delavan was allowed to testify over objection
that there was no boat launch when Boothe executed the 1949 quit claim deed. Tr Vol. I, p. 497,
L. 25 – p. 499, L. 14.
6.

The Creation of Boothe Park

On January 21, 1955, the Boothes executed a quitclaim deed to the Coeur d’Alene Highway
District donating certain land to the District for use as a public park. Trial Exhibit 5. This deed
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was recorded January 21, 1955 as Instrument No. 292547. Id. East Side Highway District is the
successor to the Coeur d’Alene Highway District. AR-3.
On August 21, 1956, the District’s minutes reflect the commissioners decided to
“straighten out” all the property lines at Booth’s [sic] Park to the satisfaction of all the property
owners adjoining the park. Trial Exhibit 8.
Thereafter, Ray Kindler was hired and prepared a survey of Boothe Park for the District in
August, 1956. Trial Exhibit 9, attached as Appendix A.4 The 1956 park survey included the names
of all the property owners adjoining Boothe Park, which was Walker lying northerly, Wiks lying
easterly and Delavan lying southerly. Id. The survey included a depiction of the public road. Id.
The survey identified iron pipes set by a previous surveyor, Ashley. Id. It identified concrete
monuments along the boundaries of the park. Id. It also identified existing fences. Id. Regarding
the shared property line between Oliver and Edna and Boothe Park, the survey indicated: “This
line has fence along its entire length” with arrows indicating the entire length. Id.
The District’s business records regarding Kindler’s activities also included a copy of a
letter dated October 5, 1956, from Ray Kindler to local attorney J. Ward Arney. Trial Exhibit 11.
This letter stated Kindler surveyed Boothe Park at the request of the District to determine the
boundaries of the park because the description in the deed from Boothe to the District did not
actually cover the area involved. Id. The letter discussed the boundary lines of Wik’s parcel. Id.
Kindler informed Arney, “[i]n order not to cause any trouble with the adjacent property owner’s
Walker, Delavan [sic] and Wiks, we followed the old fence lines as closely as possible.” Id. The
letter included a legal description of the park prepared by Kindler of Boothe Park showing it

Trial Exhibit 9 was an oversized document. The Clerk’s Record contains a poor-quality photograph of the exhibit.
Therefore, the District has requested on appeal that it be granted leave by the Court to conventionally file the
Appendix to its opening brief because it includes this oversized exhibit.
4
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contained 102.5 feet of shoreline. Id. Regarding the boundary between the Delavan parcel and
the park, the legal description indicated it ran:
...to a concrete monument set in the fence line; then N86°15’W along the fence line,
80.75 feet to a concrete monument; thence S78°40’W along the fence line, 63.9 feet
to a concrete monument; thence S68°53’W along the fence line 149.45 feet to a
concrete monument set at the waters edge of Lake Coeur d’Alene;..
Id.
The legal description concluded: “Comprising Boothe Park as agreed upon by all the adjacent land
owner’s [sic]. Id.
7.

The Delavan Chain Link Fence

Jack Delavan testified in his deposition that his father erected a chain link fence between
the park and his property shortly after the ramp was constructed.5 AR-23, J. Delavan Dep. Tr. p.
60, Ll. 16-18. Later, he clarified his testimony and indicated he couldn’t swear when the chain
link fence was built because Oliver built fences all the way around the property. AR-27, J. Delavan
Dep. Tr. p 75, L. 22 – p. 76, L. 4. Jack testified there were some old posts and remnants of a fence
when his father bought the property because the whole property had been fenced at one time. AR27, J. Delavan Dep. Tr. p. 76, Ll. 8-17. According to Jack, Oliver followed the same fence lines
when reconstructing the fence. AR-27, J. Delavan Dep. Tr. p. 76, Ll. 18-20. Jack was unsure
whether the fence went to the water’s edge. AR-27, J. Delavan Dep. Tr. p. 76, L. 20 – P. 77, L. 3.
Although portions of the chain link fence were removed, the metal fence posts still remain. Tr
Vol. I, p. 37, L. 17 – p. 47, L. 20; p. 62, L. 23 – p. 64, L. 15, p. 95, Ll. 5-17; p. 473, Ll. 6-18; p.
474, Ll. 3-11; Trial Exhibits GGG, JJJ, OOO, PPP, XXX, and 38.

Jack Delavan was called as a witness at trial by video deposition. Tr Vol. I, p. 549, L. 25 – p. 551, L. 14. The
video deposition and the original transcript of Jack Delavan were admitted by stipulation as Trial Exhibit EEEE,
together with copies of the deposition exhibits. Id. The Clerk’s Record only contains the video and a motion to
augment the record with the transcript has been submitted. (Jack Delavan’s deposition transcript is included in the
record as an exhibit to Plaintiff’s notice of objection to designated portions of Jack Delavan’s testimony.)
5
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Jack was allowed to testify, over objection, that the chain link fence was constructed by
Oliver as a boundary to keep children off the Delavans’ property. AR-16J. Delavan Dep. Tr. p.
32, L. 6 – p. 33, L. 8. Gregory Delavan was allowed to testify, over objection, that the fence was
managed as a barrier, and not as a boundary. Tr Vol. I, p. 484, L. 9 – p. 485, L. 4.
8.

The Delavan Property Exchanges Hands

On October 1, 1991, Frank and Jack, acting as co-personal representatives of the estate of
Oliver, executed a deed of distribution to their mother, Edna, for Lots 19, 20 and 21 of the
Lakeshore Addition. Trial Exhibit 15. This deed was recorded October 7, 1991, as Instrument
No. 1234371. Id. The deed was recorded at the request of Walker & Reagan, and the notary
stamps bear the signature of local attorney Michael E. Reagan. Id. Frank and Jack did not execute
a deed of distribution for the property transferred to Oliver and Edna by the Boothes in the 1949
quitclaim deed. Id.
On October 3, 1991, Frank and Jack, acting as the co-personal representatives of the estate
of Edna, executed a distribution deed for lots 19, 20 and 21 of the Lakeshore Addition to Jack.
Trial Exhibit 16 and G. This deed was recorded October 7, 1991, as Instrument No. 1234372. Id.
The deed was recorded at the request of Walker & Reagan and was notarized by local attorney
Michael E. Reagan. Id. Again, the deed did not include the property transferred to Oliver and
Edna by the Boothes in the 1949 by quitclaim deed. Id. There is no evidence in the record that
the property conveyed by the 1949 Boothe quitclaim deed to Oliver and Edna was conveyed by
the estate to any party. Thus, there is a break in the chain of title.
On January 10, 1995, Jack and Beverly, husband and wife, conveyed by warranty deed
certain real property to Gregory and Ellen Delavan, husband and wife. Trial Exhibit 19. The
property was described by a metes and bounds description prepared by Meckel Engineering on

18

January 17, 1995. Id. The deed indicated it described the real property conveyed in 1949 by quit
claim deed from John and Gertrude Booth [sic] to Oliver and Beverly, recorded as Instrument No.
224726. Id. The legal description was a detailed metes and bounds description of the parcel Jack
and Beverly covneyed to Gregory and Ellen. Id. The point of beginning for the legal description
(contained in Exhibit A attached to the deed) commenced at the northwest corner of Lot 19
according to the plat of Lakeshore Addition. Id. It then ran easterly 328.80 feet to the edge of the
existing county road (as it existed in 1995). Id. The course then followed the southerly edge of
the existing county road along a curve of the existing county road and incorporated certain
monuments shown in the 1977 Meckel survey of Boothe Park (which itself incorporated the
concrete monuments noted by Ray Kindler in his 1956 survey of Boothe Park). The final call of
the western boundary was “to a one- half inch diameter iron rod in the shore of Lake Coeur
d’Alene…” Id. The call along the water front was South 29°08’37” East, 65.80 feet along the
shore to the POINT OF BEGINNING.” Id. In other words, the amount of waterfront deeded by
Jack and Beverly to Gregory and Ellen was 65.80 feet. Id.
This deed was notarized by Mary R. Hopkins on January 10, 1995 whose notary expired
October 16, 1995. Id. This deed was recorded March 23, 1995, by Kootenai County Title
Company as Instrument No. 1392298, records of Kootenai County, Idaho. Id.
Another warranty deed from Jack and Beverly to Gregory and Ellen indicated it was
executed December 30, 1997. Trial Exhibit 20. It was recorded by Gregory Delavan on December
31, 1997, as Instrument No. 1519383. Id. The deed was irregular on its face because it was
notarized two years prior to its execution by the grantors. Id. As with the prior deed from Jack
and Beverly to Gregory and Ellen, this deed was notarized by Mary R. Hopkins on January 10,
1995 and indicated her notary expired October 16, 1995. Id. This deed contained the same legal
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description as the 1949 Boothe quitclaim deed to Oliver and Edna absent the typographical errors.
Id.
On August 19, 2010, Gregory and Ellen quitclaimed a parcel to themselves as community
property with rights of survivorship the real property described in their first deed from Jack and
Beverly (Instrument No. 1392298) Trial Exhibit I. Thus, this deed also recognized it described
65.80 feet of shore. Id.
On April 14, 2014, Jack and Beverly quit claimed property to Gregory and Ellen with yet
another description which indicated it was bounded on the east by Boothe Park Road, on the North
by the land described in a Quit Claim Deed recorded as Instrument No. 224726 [the 1949 Boothe
deed], on the West by the ordinary high water mark of Lake Coeur d’Alene, and on the South by
the land described in the Warranty Deed recorded as Instrument No. 1392298, all records of
Kootenai County, Idaho. Trial Exhibit J.
9.

Jack Delavan’s Boundary Representations Prior to the Present Dispute

Before the present dispute over the common boundary line arose, Jack contacted the
Kootenai County assessor by telephone on June 18, 1992 and a memorandum of the call was made
by the deputy assessor. Tr Vol. I, p. 191, Ll. 17-25; p. 193, L. 13 – p. 194, L. 12; p. 197, L. 10 –
p. 200, L. 10. Trial Exhibit 18 (page 58 of 583). The “Action Requested” portion of the
memorandum indicated: “We are assessing him for a total of 300’ front feet on these 2 parcels –
He said Meckel surveyed this fall 1991 and it shows a total of 266’. He would like this changed –
please contact him soon so if it isn’t change [sic] he can file an appeal before Monday 5 p.m.” Id.
The assessments included with the note indicated Jack was being taxed for Lots 19, 20 and 21,
Lakeshore Add. Sunnyside. Id.
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A separate “Memo to File” dated June 24, 1992, indicated the frontage and acreage
assessment for Jack was amended. Tr Vol. I, p. 200, L. 11 p. 204, L. 12; Exhibit 18 (page 57 of
583). In the survey information, it indicated the assessor received an unrecorded survey from Jim
Meckel with Meckel Engineering depicting the boundary between the parcel owned by Jack
Delavan and the park parcel. Id. The memorandum indicated: “Jim Meckel provided survey
information and included a note as to the boundary by agreement between Kootenai County and
Delavan Sr.; said boundary being the same as shown on prior surveys.” Id. This document also
indicated: “Mr. Delavan was contacted by phone 6-22-92, at which time Jack Delavan stated to
his knowledge the agreement between his father and the County (as to the boundary between the
properties) was verbal only, and that he had no supporting documentation other than the Meckel
survey.” Id.
According to IDOL, the Delavans’ commercial marina was originally built in 1961 by
Oliver. Tr Vol. I, p. 142. In December 1992, Jack submitted an application to the Idaho
Department of Lands (“IDOL”) for an expansion of the marina and replacement of older docks
that included a boundary survey plot and architect plan. Tr Vol. I, p. 129, L. 7-23; p. 131, L. 1 p. 132, L. 16; Exhibit 17 ( p. 46 of 583).
Regarding the marina plan, Jack testified he redesigned the marina and drew the new
marina plan, then gave it to an architect, Bill Dahlberg, to finalize. AR-18, J. Delavan Dep. Tr.
p. 41, Ll. 8-4, p. 49, Ll. 15-21. Included in Jack’s application to IDOL was a marina plan with a
label identifying William Dahlberg, architect. Tr Vol. I, p. 132, Ll. 17 – 22; Trial Exhibit 17 (p.
47 of 583).6 This architect plan depicted the property boundary line between Booth [sic] Park
and Jack’s property. Id. The architect rendering indicated the public boat ramp was not on
A picture of Trial Exhibit 17 is attached as Appendix D to this brief because the photograph of the exhibit taken by
the district clerk cut off the lower right hand corner containing the label identifying William Dahlberg, Architect.
6
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Jack’s side of the properly line. Id. The architect drawing was consistent with Kindler’s survey.
Tr Vol. I, p. 328, L. 24 – p. 330, L. 4.
Regarding the survey plot submitted to IDOL as part of Jack’s application package, it
indicated Jack’s shore front was limited to 65.80 feet for an area identified as Lot 19. Id.
10.

Boothe Park Road Encroachment

On July 13, 2009, the District posted an encroachment notice on a wall constructed by the
Delavans near the boat launch. Trial Exhibit 30. On July 22, 2009, the Delavans disagreed the
retaining wall they built was an encroachment. Trial Exhibit 31. On December 11, 2009, the
District notified the Delavans they disagreed with their assessment and required the structure be
removed. Trial Exhibit 32. The Delavans sent a follow up note and continued to disagree regarding
whether the retaining wall was an encroachment. Trial Exhibit 33. The retaining wall is depicted
in the record. Trial Exhibits 42 and 43.

II. ISSUES ON APPEAL
1.
2.
3.
4.

Did the district court err in its interpretation of the 1949 deed from the Boothes to
Oliver Delavan and Edna Delavan?
Did the district court err in holding there was no boundary by agreement between the
District’s predecessor and the Delavans predecessors?
Did the district court err in holding I.C. § 40-202(3) did not apply?
Did the district court err in the decree it entered?

III. STANDARDS OF REVIEW
A.

Interpretation of a Deed

In Baker v. KAL, LLC, 163 Idaho 530, ___, 415 P.3d 939, 942 (2018), this Court held:
When reviewing a district court’s interpretation of a deed, the standard of review
"depends on whether the instrument is ambiguous." C & G, Inc. v. Rule, 135 Idaho
763, 765, 25 P.3d 76, 78 (2001). Whether a deed is ambiguous is a question of law,
over which we exercise free review. Id. "Interpretation of an ambiguous document
presents a question of fact, and we will defer to the findings of the trial court so
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long as those findings are supported by substantial and competent evidence." Id.
However, interpretation of an unambiguous document is a question of law, and a
matter of free review. Id.
Ida-Therm, LLC v. Bedrock Geothermal, LLC, 154 Idaho 6, 8, 293 P.3d 630, 632
(2012).
B.

Findings and Conclusions of a Trial Court

This Court in In re Estate of Smith, ___ Idaho ___, ___, ___ P.3d ___, ___ (Docket No.
45313, issued July 30, 2018) held:
This Court reviews a trial court's conclusions following a bench trial by determining
whether the evidence supports the trial court's findings of fact, and whether those
findings support the conclusions of law. Or. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Farm Bureau Mut.
Ins. Co. of Idaho, 148 Idaho 47, 50, 218 P.3d 391, 394 (2009). "This Court will
not disturb findings of fact on appeal that are supported by substantial and
competent evidence, even if there is conflicting evidence at trial." Green River
Ranches, LLC v. Silva Land Co., 162 Idaho 385, 389, 397 P.3d 1144, 1148 (2017).
Substantial and competent evidence is relevant evidence that a reasonable mind
might accept to support a conclusion. Id. (quoting Lamar Corp. v. City of Twin
Falls, 133 Idaho 36, 42-43, 981 P.2d 1146, 1152-53 (1999)). Our view of the facts
will not be substituted for that of the trial court and only erroneous findings will be
set aside. Id. On the other hand, we will freely review conclusions of law and will
draw our own conclusions based on the factual record. Id.
Substantial evidence is relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept to support
the conclusion reached; it is more than a scintilla and less than a preponderance. Kinney v.
Tupperware Co., 117 Idaho 765, 769, 792 P.2d 330, 334 (1990). Competent evidence is legally
admissible evidence that tends to prove the matter in dispute, i.e. is relevant and material.
Competent evidence is legally admissible evidence that tends to prove the matter in
dispute (i.e., relevant and material). Black’s Law Dictionary 636 (Bryan A. Gardner ed., 9th ed.,
West 2009) defines competent evidence with reference to admissible evidence and relevant
evidence. Evidence is relevant if it has any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of
consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be
without the evidence. I.R.E. 401; State v. Stevens, 146 Idaho 139, 143, 191 P.3d 217, 221 (2008).
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Whether a fact is of consequence or material is determined by its relationship to the legal
theories presented by the parties. State v. Johnson, 148 Idaho 664, 671, 227 P.3d 918, 925
(2010). Whether evidence is relevant is a question of law that this Court reviews de novo. State
v. Joy, 155 Idaho 1, 6, 304 P.3d 276, 281 (2013).
Idaho Rule of Evidence 402 provides relevant evidence is admissible unless precluded
under the rules of evidence. Idaho Rule of Evidence 602 allows a witness to testify to a matter
only if evidence is introduced sufficient to support a finding that the witness has personal
knowledge of the matter. Testimony that amounts to speculation or conjecture is not relevant and
therefore not admissible. Slack v. Kelleher, 140 Idaho 916, 923, 104 P.3d 958, 965 (2004).
Fact findings should be conclusive and where they are uncertain or evasive, they do not
support the judgment. Bentley v. Kasiska, 49 Idaho 416, 422-423, 288 P. 897 (1930).
C.

Interpretation of a Statute

In the recent case of State v. Kraly, ___ Idaho ___, ___, ____ P.3d ___ ___ (Docket No.
44892, issued August 3, 2018) this Court set forth standard of review for interpretation of a statute
as:
This Court exercises free review over statutory interpretation because it is a
question of law. Saint Alphonsus Reg'l Med. Ctr. v. Raney, 163 Idaho 342, __, 413
P.3d 742, 745 (2018).
The objective of statutory interpretation is to derive the intent of the
legislative body that adopted the act. Statutory interpretation begins with the
literal language of the statute. Provisions should not be read in isolation, but
must be interpreted in the context of the entire document. The statute should
be considered as a whole, and words should be given their plain, usual, and
ordinary meanings. It should be noted that the Court must give effect to all
the words and provisions of the statute so that none will be void, superfluous,
or redundant. When the statutory language is unambiguous, the clearly
expressed intent of the legislative body must be given effect, and the Court
need not consider rules of statutory construction.
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Id. (quoting State v. Dunlap, 155 Idaho 345, 361-62, 313 P.3d 1, 17-18). "A statute
is ambiguous where the language is capable of more than one reasonable
construction." Id. "Only where the language is ambiguous will this Court look to
rules of construction for guidance and consider the reasonableness of proposed
interpretations." City of Idaho Falls v. H-K Contractors, Inc., 163 Idaho 579, __,
416 P.3d 951, 954 (2018).
D.

Summary Judgment

In Baker v. KAL, LLC, 163 Idaho 530, 415 P.3d 939, 941 (2018), this Court held:
In reviewing grants of summary judgment, this Court uses the same standard
as the district court. Cnty. of Boise v. Idaho Cntys. Risk Mgmt. Program,
Underwriters, 151 Idaho 901, 904, 265 P.3d 514, 517 (2011). Summary
judgment must be granted " if the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on
file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as
to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a
matter of law." I.R.C.P. 56(c). In determining whether a genuine issue of
material fact exists and whether the prevailing party was entitled to judgment
as a matter of law, this Court exercises free review. Doe v. City of Elk River,
144 Idaho 337, 338, 160 P.3d 1272, 1273 (2007).

IV. ARGUMENT
A.

The district court failed to address a gap in the chain of title

Gregory and Ellen sought to quiet title in this matter to property they acquired from Jack
and Beverly. However, their evidence at trial failed to show that the property deeded from the
Boothes to Oliver and Edna was passed from the estate of Oliver and Edna to Jack and Beverly.
Therefore, Jack and Beverly could not deed the property Oliver and Edna acquired from the
Boothes to Gregory and Ellen. The trial court did not address this fatal gap in the chain of title in
its decision.
B.

The district court erred in its interpretation of the 1949 Boothe deed
1.

Legal Standard Applicable to Deed Interpretation

In Neider v. Shaw, 138 Idaho 503, 508 65 P.3d 525, 530 (2003), this Court held:
When construing an instrument that conveys an interest in land, courts seek to give
effect to the intent of the parties to the transaction. Daugharty v. Post Falls
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Highway Dist., 134 Idaho 731, 735, 9 P.3d 534, 538 (2000) (citing Gardner v.
Fliegel, 92 Idaho 767, 770, 450 P.2d 990, 993 (1969)). The intent of the parties is
determined by viewing the conveyance instrument as a whole. Id. (citing Doyle v.
Ortega, 125 Idaho 458, 461, 872 P.2d 721, 724 (1994)). Interpretation of an
unambiguous conveyance instrument is a question of law to be settled by its plain
language. City of Kellogg v. Mission Mtn. Interests Ltd., Co., 135 Idaho 239, 243,
16 P.3d 915, 919 (2000). Interpretation of an ambiguous deed is a question of fact
to be settled by the language in the conveyance instrument and the facts and
circumstances of the transaction. Id. Whether a deed is ambiguous is a question of
law. Id. at 244, 16 P.3d at 920.
Further, this Court held in Boyd-Davis v. Baker, 157 Idaho 688, 691-692, 339 P.3d 749, 752-753
(2014):
When construing a deed description, effect must be given, if possible, to all of the
language contained in the description." Sun Valley Shamrock Res., Inc. v. Travelers
Leasing Corp., 118 Idaho 116, 119, 794 P.2d 1389, 1392 (1990). " In ascertaining
a disputed boundary, the calls in the respective deeds cannot be disregarded if they
can be applied and harmonized in any reasonable manner . . . ." 12 Am.Jur.2d
Boundaries § 56 (2009). The district court's construction of the deeds changed all
of the calls in both deeds. That is not a reasonable construction of the deeds.
In deciding whether a deed is ambiguous, the Court seeks to determine whether it is
“reasonably subject to conflicting interpretation.” C&G, Inc. v. Rule, 135 Idaho 763, 767, 25 P.3d
76, 80 (2001). In Hoch v. Vance, 155 Idaho 636, 639, 315 P.3d 824, 827 (2013), this Court held:
“Ambiguity may be found where the language of the deed is subject to conflicting
interpretations.” Marek, 153 Idaho at 53, 278 P.3d at 924 (quoting Porter, 146
Idaho at 404, 195 P.3d at 1217). “However, ambiguity is not present merely because
the parties present differing interpretations to the court.” Jasso v. Camas Cnty., 151
Idaho 790, 798, 264 P.3d 897, 905 (2011). To determine whether a deed is
ambiguous, it must be reviewed as a whole. Neider v. Shaw, 138 Idaho 503, 508,
65 P.3d 525, 530 (2003).
Accord, Kirk v. Wescott, 160 Idaho 893, 900, 382 P.3d 342, 349 (2016).
This Court addressed conflicting interpretations in Porter v. Bassett, 146 Idaho 399, 404,
195 P.3d 1212, 1217 (2008), wherein it held “...[C]onflicting interpretations may arise when a
phrase lends itself, without contortion, to a number of inconsistent meanings...” In Cannon v.
Perry, 144 Idaho 728, 731, 170 P.3d 393, 396 (2007), this Court held ‘[p]arol evidence, however,
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is admissible to establish “any fact that does not vary, alter, or contradict the terms of the
instrument or the legal effect of the terms used.’ 29A Am.Jur.2d Evidence § 1106 (1994); accord
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 218 (1979).”
Regarding a latent ambiguity due to a lost monument, 11 C.J.S. Boundaries, § 21 explains:
Before a court determines that an otherwise unambiguous deed contains a latent
ambiguity because a monument described in the deed is currently missing, it must
first determine whether the evidence establishes that the monument, though
missing, previously existed at the location described by the deed. If the court
concludes that the monument previously existed at the location described in the
deed, the deed does not contain a latent ambiguity and the court should not look
beyond the deed to evaluate the intent of its drafter.
2.

The District Court erred in its interpretation of the 1949 Boothe deed

In Akers v. D.L. White Const., Inc., 142 Idaho 293, 299-300, 1297 P.3d 196, 202-203
(2005), this Court held:
Under Idaho law, physical features existing on the ground and referred to in the
deed must be considered when construing that deed. Miller, 140 Idaho at 216, 91
P.3d at 1120. References to monuments control over conflicting calls for courses
and distances if the monument is of a permanent nature and established with
reasonable certainty. Id. at 217, 91 P.3d at 1121. "[A] monument is generally
considered to be a permanent, visible and identifiable physical feature." Weaver,
134 Idaho at 697, 8 P.3d at 1240.
At the time the Boothes deeded the parcel to Oliver and Edna, John Boothe was aware of
the lot numbering mistake. Thus, it is significant that the point of beginning of the metes and
bounds description contains a call to the northwest corner of Lot 19 as platted, then “...to the West
boundary of the existing county road; thence along the existing right of way line of said county
road to its intersection with the meander line of Lake Coeurd’Alene.”

This language is

unambiguous and indicates the road existed in 1949 and terminated at the meander line of Lake
Coeur d’Alene. Therefore, the deed was not ambiguous as written in 1949.
The district court concluded as a matter of law in Conclusion No. 4 that the 1949 Boothe
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quit claim deed to Oliver and Edna was latently ambiguous. The district court also concluded in
Conclusion No. 6 as a matter of law when the Boothes conveyed the “unplatted lot” to the
Delavans in 1949, they intended to grant the Delavans an additional one hundred feet of lake
frontage to reflect their title ownership. The District contends the district court erred as a matter
of law in reaching these conclusions. The trial court’s findings, conclusions and verdict are
attached as Appendix F.
The findings which support the trial court’s conclusion that the Boothe deed was latently
ambiguous are Findings No. 8, 9, 10, 11, 14, 15 and 22. Addressing Finding No. 8, the trial
court found Boothe Park Road as it existed in 1949 did not continue beyond Oliver’s driveway
and did not reach the meander line of Lake Coeur d’Alene. The District does not disagree that
Oliver’s driveway intersected the public road in 1949, but it does disagree with the district
court’s finding that the public road did not continue beyond that point because that portion of the
finding it is not supported by substantial and competent evidence. 7
Gregory Delavan testified regarding the termination of the road at Oliver’s driveway over
objection. Tr Vol. I, p. 497 L. 25 – p. 502. L. 14. Gregory was born in 1953. Gregory had no
personal knowledge of the public road location in 1949. It was error for the trial court to allow
this testimony and utilize it in its decision.
However, a bald claim of error is not enough to reverse a finding of fact. In Ballard v.
Kerr, 160 Idaho 674, 378 P.3d 464 (2016), this Court held:
"Error may not be predicated upon a ruling which admits or excludes evidence
unless the ruling is a manifest abuse of the trial court's discretion and a substantial
right of the party is affected." Van v. Portneuf Med. Ctr., Inc., 156 Idaho 696, 701,
330 P.3d 1054, 1059 (2014); see also I.R.E. 103(a); I.R.C.P. 61. In applying the
abuse of discretion standard, the Court employs a three step inquiry: " (1) whether
the lower court rightly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) whether the
The Standards of Review section of this brief sets forth the law applicable to substantial and competent evidence
and for the sake of brevity it is not repeated at this section of the brief but is incorporated herein.
7
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court acted within the boundaries of such discretion and consistently with any legal
standards applicable to specific choices; and (3) whether the court reached its
decision by an exercise of reason." Mattox v. Life Care Ctrs. of Am., Inc., 157 Idaho
468, 473, 337 P.3d 627, 632 (2014) (quoting McDaniel v. Inland Nw. Renal Care
Grp.-Idaho, LLC, 144 Idaho 219, 221-22, 159 P.3d 856, 858-59 (2007)).
Similarly, in Hurtado v. Land O'Lakes, Inc., 153 Idaho 13, 278 P.3d 415, (2012), this Court held:
The Idaho Rules of Evidence provide that " [e]rror may not be predicated upon a
ruling which admits or excludes evidence unless a substantial right of the party is
affected." I.R.E. 103(a). Similarly, under the Rules of Civil Procedure, " [t]he court
at every stage of the proceeding must disregard any error or defect in the proceeding
which does not affect the substantial rights of the parties." I.R.C.P. 61.
Turning first to the abuse of discretion issue, there is no indication in the record that the
trial court perceived the ruling on objection to this evidence as a discretionary matter. Assuming
it did, it did not act within the boundaries of such discretion and consistent with legal standards
applicable to its legal choices. There was no foundation for Gregory to testify regarding the
location of the public road prior to his birth. The court sustained the objection on foundation, but
then allowed his counsel to pose the question as a leading question preparatory to a nonleading
question, which was never posed. When the District’s counsel was objecting to the answer, the
district court overruled the objection without allowing counsel to finish the basis for the objection.
Thus, it can’t be said the trial court reached its decision through an exercise of reason.
Turning next to the substantial rights of the District, Idaho Rule of Evidence 401 defines
relevant evidence as evidence that has any tendency to make a fact more or less probable than it
would be without the evidence and is a fact of consequence in determining the action. The location
of the existing county road in 1949 was a fact of consequence in the litigation because it affects
the interpretation of the 1949 Boothe deed. Thus, the District’s substantial right was prejudiced
when the district court allowed Gregory Delavan to testify without personal knowledge that the
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county road did not reach the meander line of Lake Coeur d’Alene in 1949 and did not extend past
Oliver’s driveway in 1949.
Next, the district court found in Finding No. 9 that the precise course of the road near its
terminus at it existed in 1949 was indeterminable because Boothe Park as it exists today is a wide
parking area for the park and the boat ramp, thus precluding the trial court from determining where
the road existed in 1949. This finding contradicts Finding of Fact No. 8 and is not supported by
substantial evidence.
It is undisputed that Oliver built a house in 1949. It is undisputed it included a driveway
that accessed the public road. It is undisputed the District plowed the public road and Oliver’s
driveway, and turned the plow around on Oliver’s property during Gregory’s childhood.
There was no evidence that the public road leading to Oliver’s driveway changed course
or direction through the years. In fact, Jack testified they used the same Boothe Park Road when
his father purchased as currently existed. AR-19, J. Delavan Dep. Tr. p. 44, Ll. 2- 25. Marilyn
Moore testified the public road existed the same in 2015 as it existed in 1949.
The road and Oliver’s driveway are discernible in the 1951 aerial photograph submitted as
Exhibit AAA even though it is grainy. There was no evidence any of the Delavans have changed
the location where Oliver’s driveway accessed the public road. The location of the house relative
to the driveway can be somewhat discerned in the 1951 aerial photograph. Its location can more
easily be determined from review of the marina plan contained in Exhibit 17 (page 47 of 583) the
relevant portion of which is set out in Appendix B (with the addition of a red arrow to a survey
monument discussed below):
In Finding No. 9, the district court also found the precise course of the projected right-ofway line of Boothe Park Road as it existed in 1949 could not be determined. Again, this finding
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is not supported by substantial or competent evidence.
In the 1956 Kindler park boundary survey, four concrete survey monuments were identified
along the southerly boundary of the survey. These survey monuments have been identified in all
subsequent surveys. (Trial Exhibits 9, 13, 17, 18, and 21).
The configuration of the park parcel in these surveys is reminiscent of the Big Dipper
constellation. One of these survey monuments is located at the area where the handle connects to
the dipper. This is best illustrated in Exhibit 21, a redacted portion of which is attached as
Appendix C (with the addition of a red arrow to one of the survey monument)8:
Oliver’s driveway was installed east of the above identified survey marker (east is towards
the bottom of the above excerpt). The intersection of the driveway with the public road is depicted
in Exhibits 38, NNN and PPP. Every surveyor who has surveyed this area determined the basis of
bearing of the line as it crosses the Delavan’s driveway and extended west to the shore line of Lake
Coeur d’Alene. Every surveyor who has done the survey used a consistent basis of bearing for the
line. Kindler identified the basis of bearing as S 65°58’W. The other surveyors identified it at S
68°56’30” W. If one were to accept the trial court’s finding that the public road in 1949 terminated
at Delavan’s driveway, based on the multiple surveys in the record it is apparent the right-of-way
line is easily extended to the shores of Lake Coeur d’Alene by utilizing the same basis of bearing
of the line as it exists across the intersection of the Delavans’ driveway to the meander of Lake
Coeur d’Alene.
Regarding Finding No. 15, there is no evidence in the record that the public roads depicted
in the plat map were never built. There is evidence that the construction of Highway 10 may have
displaced some of the platted roads. Exhibits 18 and 21.

8

North on this survey would be to the left hand side of the page.
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Finally, Finding No. 22 is not supported by substantial and competent evidence. In this
finding, the trial court held “[t]he course of Boothe Park Road in 1949 beyond the entry to the park
area is indeterminable because the park, parking lot, boat ramp, and improvement to the road have
occurred since 1955.” Again, this finding contradicts the trial court’s prior finding that the public
road in 1949 extended to Oliver’s driveway. There was no evidence the location of the road itself
changed even though a concrete boat ramp was installed at its terminus, and a park was developed
north of the public road. In fact, as previously discussed, the testimony of Moore and Jack was
that the location of Boothe Park Road as it exists today has not changed since 1949.
Thus, the trial court’s Conclusion No. 5 that the location of Boothe Park Road in 1949 after
its entered the area of Boothe Park is indeterminable is not supported by substantial and competent
evidence. The trial court should have interpreted the 1949 Boothe deed with reference to the
specific language of the deed, including the location of the public road as supported by the
evidence.
Further, even if the deed were latently ambiguous, the district court’s conclusion that the
Boothes intended to deed the Delavans an “unplatted lot” which included an additional one
hundred feet of waterfront is not supported by substantial and competent evidence. The findings
of Fact which support this conclusion are Finding Nos. 5 and 7. In Finding No. 5, the district court
recognized that the lots possessed by some property owners did not match their conveyances,
which the District does not dispute on appeal. The District does dispute the portion of this finding
wherein the district court concluded Oliver Delavan possessed 100 fewer feet of lake frontage than
he possessed title to pursuant to the plat and his deeds. As noted in the statement of facts, and as
testified to at trial, Oliver and Edna had a title issue, and did not pursue any legal remedy to
determine if they had a right to the lots as deeded or were entitled to a deed reformation. At most,
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the evidence showed that Oliver and Edna may have had an expectation arising from the Wasmer
deed about the amount of land they were purchasing which may not have matched the property to
which they took possession.
In Finding No. 7, the district court inferred, based on the evidence presented, that the
Boothe deed was reparative of the numbering problem and was intended by the Boothes to grant
the Delavan the amount of lake frontage which the Delavans thought they received under their
title. 9 The district court concluded that the conveyance of the “unplatted lot” was intended to
provide 100 feet of lake frontage.
The district court does not identify the evidence upon which it relied in drawing its
inference that by deeding a parcel to Oliver and Edna four years after their purchase from Wasmer
that the Boothes intended Oliver and Edna would acquire one hundred feet of lake frontage to
match their expectation arising under the Wasmer deed. The district court fails to recognize the
area transferred by Boothe was described by a specific metes and bounds description, and was not
an “unplatted lot”, which may explain why the district court decided it should match other lot
widths and provide one hundred feet of lake frontage. In fact, this deed was not an “unplatted lot”.
Further, the Boothes was not a party to the Wasmer deed and made no mistake in that transaction.
There was no evidence in the record that the Boothes intended to guarantee Oliver and Edna any
specific lake frontage. Thus, the trial court’s conclusion that the Delavans proved such intent by
a preponderance of the evidence was error.
C.

The district court erred in finding there was no boundary agreement
1.

Legal standards

The trial court also inferred the lots were measured along the shore. The lot widths in the plat are not measured
along the lake shore, which meander. They are measured between the north and south boundaries of the lots to
determine the one hundred foot width. See Trial Exhibit 21.
9
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The district claimed in its complaint that the parties reached a boundary by agreement. In
Neider v. Shaw, 138 Idaho 503, 506, 65 P.3d 525, 528 (2003), this Court held:
The doctrine of boundary by agreement is well established in Idaho. Boundary by
agreement requires: (1) an uncertain or disputed boundary involving adjacent
properties, and (2) an agreement fixing the boundary. Cox v. Clanton, 137 Idaho
492, 495, 50 P.3d 987, 990 (2002). The agreement may be express or implied by
the conduct of the parties. Id. Where a fence is alleged to establish a boundary by
agreement, and there is no evidence regarding who built the fence or why they built
it, the fact that the fence has been in existence for a number of years strongly
suggests it was put in place as a boundary by agreement. Id.; see also Johnson v.
Newport, 131 Idaho 521, 523, 960 P.2d 742, 744 (1998) (finding fence in existence
for sixty years established boundary by agreement); Dreher v. Powell, 120 Idaho
715, 718–19, 819 P.2d 569, 572–73 (Ct.App.1991) (finding fence in present
location for over sixty years established boundary by agreement); Herrmann v.
Woodell, 107 Idaho 916, 920, 693 P.2d 1118, 1122 (Ct.App.1985) (neighboring
landowners accepted fence as boundary for many years). Which party pays property
tax on the disputed land is irrelevant to determining a claim based on boundary by
agreement. Cameron v. Neal, 130 Idaho 898, 901, 950 P.2d 1237, 1240 (1997)
(citing Trappett v. Davis, 102 Idaho 527, 633 P.2d 592 (1981)). Further, an agreed
boundary binds successors in interest who purchase with notice, actual or
constructive. Paurley v. Harris, 75 Idaho 112, 117, 268 P.2d 351, 353 (1954).
Further, the District had the burden of proving the two elements of boundary by agreement by
clear and convincing evidence. Weitz v. Green, 148 Idaho 851, 860, 230 P.3d 743, 752 (2010).
2.

The trial court erred in holding there was no boundary by agreement

In the first phase of trial, the district court addressed whether there was a boundary by
agreement and concluded as a matter of law that the District failed to prove, even by a
preponderance of the evidence, either element of a boundary by agreement. The District court also
concluded as a matter of law that all use of the boat launch had been with the permission of Gregory
and Ellen and their predecessors in interest. In support of these conclusions of law, the trial court
entered findings of fact. A copy of the court’s Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Verdict
are attached as Appendix E to this brief.
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In Finding No. 2, the district court found that the boat launch is located in the northwest
corner of Lot 19. R p. 768. That fact is not supported by any substantial or competent evidence in
the record. The Delavans claim it is located on the parcel conveyed in 1949 by the Boothes to
Oliver and Edna. It is unclear how this erroneous finding affected the trial court’s conclusions of
law.
In Finding No. 9, the district court held Oliver and Edna permitted the boat launch to be
placed in their Lot 19 and all generations of Delavans have given permission for the public to
utilize it. The trial court also held the fence did not constitute a boundary. R. p. 768
Following the second trial, the district court entered additional findings which addressed
the boundary by agreement. Finding No. 18 held the fence line was intended as a barrier, not a
boundary. Finding No. 20 held Kindler’s survey was more of a wish list of what the property lines
might be to achieve harmonious relations with the area landowners but did not establish the actual
location of the property lines. In Finding No. 25, the trial court held all the Delavans historically
maintained the boat ramp and claimed it as their own.
Turning to the first element of an uncertain or disputed boundary, the minutes of the Coeur
d’Alene Highway District establish there was such uncertainty about the boundary in 1956. As
set out in the statement of facts, the minutes of the Coeur d’Alene Highway district reflect the
District hired Kindler as its agent to resolve the uncertain boundary with its adjoining neighbors.
This Court addressed the authority of an agent to enter into a boundary by agreement in
Fischer v. Croston, 163 Idaho 331, 413 P.3d 731, 737-738 (2018), holding:
As noted, we have continually held that a boundary by agreement may be formed
between " coterminous owners." See Flying Elk, 149 Idaho at 13, 232 P.3d at 334;
Marble, 142 Idaho at 271, 127 P.3d at 174; Downing, 82 Idaho at 56, 349 P.2d at
308. While this Court has not explicitly extended this authority to an agent of a
coterminous owner, we embraced such an idea in Duff v. Seubert, where an agent’s
agreement with a coterminous owner was sufficient for a boundary by agreement.
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110 Idaho 865, 867, 719 P.2d 1125, 1127 (1985). Nevertheless, for the reasons
explained below, Jim was neither a coterminous owner nor an agent of a
coterminous owner, and he thus lacked the authority to enter into any binding
agreement or contract on behalf of the Crostons.
"There are three separate types of agency, any of which are sufficient to bind the
principal to a contract entered into by an agent with a third party[.]" Bailey v. Ness,
109 Idaho 495, 497, 708 P.2d 900, 902 (1985). " The three types of agencies are:
express authority, implied authority, and apparent authority." Id. A principal creates
agency when he,
(1) [E]xpressly grants the agent authority to conduct certain actions on his or
her behalf; (2) impliedly grants the agent authority to conduct certain actions
which are necessary to complete those actions that were expressly authorized;
or (3) apparently grants the agent authority to act through conduct towards a
third party indicating that express or implied authority has been granted.
Forbush v. Sagecrest Multi Family Prop. Owners’ Ass’n, Inc., 162 Idaho 317, 330,
396 P.3d 1199, 1212 (2017) (quoting Humphries v. Becker, 159 Idaho 728, 735,
366 P.3d 1088, 1095 (2016) ).
"This Court has previously viewed the question of whether an agency
relationship exists as a question of fact for the jury to determine." But, to be
clear, "[w]hether facts sufficient to constitute an agency relationship exist is
indeed a question of fact for the jury, however, whether a given set of facts
are sufficient to constitute an agency relationship is a question of law
appropriate for this Court’s consideration."
Forbush, 162 Idaho at 330, 396 P.3d at 1212 (citations omitted).
The district court did not address whether Kindler was the District’s agent. However, the evidence
in the record demonstrates he was acting as their agent.
The district court erred when it disregarded the District’s unrefuted historical minutes
establishing there was an uncertain or disputed boundary resulting in Kindler being hired. Further
lending credibility to this evidence was the correspondence between attorney Arney and Kindler
wherein the boundary by agreement for another coterminous owner was explained and a legal
description was provided. Finally, the contemporaneous survey description itself supports that the
District took action due to an uncertain or disputed boundary.
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Addressing next the element of an agreement fixing the boundary, as noted above, the
district court ignored the direct evidence introduced through the Kindler correspondence (Exhibit
11) that there was an express agreement, characterizing the evidence and the Kindler survey as a
mere wish list of how Kindler hoped the property owners would treat the property even though his
assignment from the District was to resolve the boundary issues.
That then left for determination by the trial court whether there was an agreement implied
by the conduct of the parties. It appears the district court’s remaining findings are intended to
address this element.
There is no dispute there was a long standing chain link fence east and west of the
Delavans’ driveway. There is no dispute Oliver constructed all his improvements south of the
location of the fence. There is no dispute the district installed a concrete boat launch north of the
location of the fence. The trial court found that the fence was installed after the concrete boat
launch was installed.

There is no evidence contradicting Jack’s testimony that Oliver

reconstructed all the fences that had previously been in place on his property. The 1956 Kindler
survey (Exhibit 9) indicates there was a fence in the location where Oliver’s chain link fence was
installed when he did his boundary survey in 1956.
As mentioned previously, the district court found the Delavan fence line was intended as a
barrier, not a boundary. This finding is based upon inadmissible testimony from Jack and Gregory.
At trial, Gregory was asked if he had any personal knowledge why the change [chain] link
fence was installed. He testified, over objection, that it was managed to prevent people from
venturing onto the marina docks. Tr. p. 484, L. 9 – p. 485, L. 4.
The standard for admission of this evidence is the same as previously discussed in this brief
regarding the holdings of Ballard v. Kerr, supra, and Hurtado v. Land O'Lakes, Inc., supra. The
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District must show both that the district court abused its discretion and the error affected a
substantial right of the District.
Turning first to the abuse of discretion issue, there is no indication in the record that the
trial court perceived its ruling as a discretionary matter. Assuming it did, it did not act within the
boundaries of such discretion and consistent with legal standards applicable to its legal choices.
There was no foundation under Rule 602, I.R.E., for Gregory to testify to Oliver’s intent when he
constructed the fence since he was not even alive then. In allowing Gregory’s testimony, the trial
court did not reach its decision by an exercise of reason.
Turning next to prejudice to the substantial rights of the District, Idaho Rule of Evidence
401 defines relevant evidence as evidence that has any tendency to make a fact more or less
probable than it would be without the evidence and is a fact of consequence in determining the
action. The purpose the chain link fence was erected was a fact of consequence in this litigation
because it was probative of the district’s claim that there was a boundary by agreement between
the Delavans and the District. Thus, the District’s substantial right was prejudiced when the district
court allowed Gregory to testify, without personal knowledge that the fence was maintained as a
barrier, not a boundary.
The only other testimony on this issue was introduced through Jack’s testimony. Jack was
asked at his deposition whether his father had ever indicated to Jack that he had agreed with Mr.
Stark or the highway district the line marked on an exhibit (along the fence line) was a boundary.
Objection was made to this question as seeking hearsay. He answered the question with a “No”.
Jack then proceeded to volunteer without a question pending that the reason his father built the
fence was kids were swimming and whatnot, and pretty soon people were slopping onto Oliver’s
dock. AR-16, J. Delavan Dep. Tr. p. 32, L. 20 – p. 33, L. 8.
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In compliance with I.R.E. 103, the District filed a motion in limine to exclude this
testimony from Jack’s deposition testimony at trial because it was hearsay and because it contained
a non-responsive narrative that provided more information than called for in the question. The
trial court denied the motion on the basis the statement did not solicit hearsay (because it asked if
a conversation had occurred rather than seeking specifics of a conversation) and the volunteered
statement was not a narrative. R p. 624.
Jack’s response that the fence was constructed as a barrier was a volunteered nonresponsive narrative which should not have been allowed after he answered “no” to the pending
question whether his father had informed him he had a boundary agreement with the District.
Besides being non-responsive, Jack did not have personal knowledge why his father built the
fence. His knowledge would have been gained through statements Oliver made to Jack, thus the
foundation for the testimony would have been inadmissible hearsay.
Turning first to the abuse of discretion issue, there is no indication in the record that the
trial court perceived the ruling on Jack’s testimony as a discretionary matter. Assuming it did, it
did not act within the boundaries of such discretion and consistent with legal standards applicable
to its legal choices. Jack’s testimony was not responsive to the pending question. By allowing the
nonresponsive narrative the trial court allowed inadmissible testimony regarding a material fact to
be admitted which exceeded the boundaries of the trial court’s discretion and was not consistent
with legal standards applicable to its choices.
Turning next to prejudice to the substantial rights of the District, Idaho Rule of Evidence
401 defines relevant evidence as evidence that has any tendency to make a fact more or less
probable than it would be without the evidence and is a fact of consequence in determining the
action. As previously noted, the purpose behind the erection of the chain link fence was material
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to the implied agreement. Thus, the District was prejudiced by admission of this testimony. Since
Jack’s and Gregory’s inadmissible testimony was the only testimony in the record regarding the
purpose the fence was constructed, Finding No. 18 has no substantial and competent evidence to
support it.
The Delavans also acknowledged this boundary by agreement through their conduct. In
1992, Jack Delavan informed the Kootenai County tax assessor there was an oral agreement
regarding the boundary. He also informed his surveyor, James Meckel of the same information at
that time, which Meckel relayed to the assessor.
In Jack’s 1992 submission to the Idaho Department of Lands (IDOL) for a marina
expansion, Jack drew the marina plan, and provided it to his architect, Dahlberg, to create a
submission for the IDOL. The IDOL marina plan prepared by Dahlberg utilizing Jack’s drawing
shows the boundary consistent with the Kindler survey. Id.
The deeds from Jack and Beverly to Gregory and Ellen also are consistent with the
boundary by agreement. The deeds identified 65.8 water frontage was conveyed to Gregory and
Ellen.
The trial court also found that the Delavans are the ones who have maintained the ramp,
which apparently is included for the inference that their conduct demonstrates they have
undertaken this responsibility because they own it.

The trial court did not specify what

maintenance was engaged in by the Delavans. Regarding Oliver, the evidence indicates Oliver’s
maintenance originated from the District paying him for it. Trial Exhibit 12. Jack’s testimony
indicates the District maintained the road to the boat launch. John Pankratz, District Supervisor,
testified the District received a request by Gregory circa 2009 to place gravel in the boat launch
area, and did so. Tr Vol. I, p. 77, Ll. 5-17. Thus, the evidence does not support a finding that the
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Delavans exclusively maintained the ramp even though there is evidence they removed debris from
it at times and placed sand on it at times.
The trial court also found Oliver and Edna and the other Delavans granted permission to
use the boat launch. Since the trial court precluded all hearsay testimony from Jack regarding this
issue, the only evidence regarding the claim that Oliver granted permissive use was received from
Pat Seale. The trial court allowed this hearsay testimony under the I.R.E. 803(1) hearsay exception
because it was a present sense impression. Tr. p. 453, Ll. 1-19.
Applying the same analysis from Ballard v. Kerr, supra, and Hurtado v. Land O'Lakes,
Inc., supra, first the abuse of discretion will be addressed, then the substantial rights of the District.
In this ruling, the trial court did recognize it was a matter of discretion. However, it’s
ruling misperceived the exception allowed by I.R.E. 803(1). Seale testified to a conversation he
said he had with Oliver in 1983. Seale’s 2015 testimony was not a statement made while or
immediately after Seale perceived the event or condition. Therefore, it was not admissible hearsay
pursuant to I.R.E. 803(1). By admitting it, the district court exceeded the boundaries of its
discretion and did not act consistent with legal standards applicable to its available legal choices.
Thus, there was an abuse of discretion.
This error affected the District’s substantial rights because it went to the conduct of the
parties, which is an element of an implied boundary agreement.10 This evidence had a tendency
to make a fact more or less probable than it would be without the evidence and is a fact of
consequence in determining the action since it is the only evidence admitted regarding permissive
use.
D.

The district court erred in granting summary judgment on the District’s claim
of a road established pursuant to I.C. § 40-202(3)

It was also relevant to the issue of a road established pursuant to I.C. § 40-202(3) as discussed later in this brief,
and this analysis applies equally to that section of the brief.
10
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1.

Legal Standard

Idaho Code § 40-202 outlines the methods for establishment of a public roadway by
maintenance and use. Idaho Code Section 40-202(3) provides: “all highways used for a period
of five (5) years, provided they shall have been worked and kept up at the expense of the
public…are highways.”
In Lattin v. Adams County, 149 Idaho 497, 502, 236 P.3d 1257 (2010), our Supreme
Court summarized the requirements:
[A] public road may be acquired: (1) if the public uses the road for a period of
five years, and (2) the road is worked and kept up at the expense of the public."
Ada County Highway Dist. v. Total Success Inv., L.L.C., 145 Idaho 360, 365, 179
P.3d 323, 328 (2008) (citing I.C. § 40-202(3)). The County must prove these
elements by a preponderance of the evidence. Floyd v. Bd. of Comm'rs, 137 Idaho
718, 724, 52 P.3d 863, 869 (2002).
In Ada Cnty Hwy. Dist. v. Total Success Inv., L.L.C., 145 Idaho 360, 366, 179 P.3d 323,
329 (2008), with respect to a public road acquired through use and maintenance, our Supreme
Court further held:
"[T]he primary factual questions are the frequency, nature and quality of the
public's use and maintenance." Id. [Floyd v. Bd. Of Comm’rs.] The public must
use the road regularly, and the use must be more than only casual or desultory.
Burrup, 114 Idaho at 53, 753 P.2d at 264. Maintenance need only be work and
repairs that are reasonably necessary; it is not necessary maintenance be
performed in each of the five consecutive years or through the entire length
of the road. Floyd, 137 Idaho at 724, 52 P.3d at 869 (citing Roberts v. Swim, 117
Idaho 9, 16, 784 P.2d 339, 346 (Ct. App. 1989); State v. Nesbitt, 79 Idaho 1, 6,
310 P.2d 787, 790 (1957), overruled on other grounds by French v. Sorensen, 113
Idaho 950, 751 P.2d 98 (1988)). (Emphasis added.)
Maintenance is defined as “"to preserve from failure or decline, or repair, refurbish, repaint or
otherwise keep an existing highway or public right-of-way in a suitable state for use including,
without limitation, snow removal, sweeping, litter control, weed abatement and placement or
repair of public safety signage.” I.C. § 40-114(3).
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2.

The trial court erred in granting summary judgment on the District’s
claim of a public road established pursuant to I.C. § 40-202(3)

Following the first trial on boundary by agreement, the Delavans moved for summary
judgment on the District’s claim of a public road established pursuant to I.C. § 40-202(3). The
trial court relied upon its finding that Defendants and their predecessors permitted the boat launch
to be placed on Lot 19 and utilized by the public, and its finding that the use of the boat launch by
all parties since its construction has been permissive, and held there can be no right established
pursuant to I.C. § 40-202(3).
This finding is predicated upon the trial court’s finding that Oliver granted the District
permission to use the area where the concrete boat ramp was located. However, as discussed
above, there is not substantial and competent evidence to support this finding. Thus, the trial court
erred when it granted summary judgment on this claim.
The district court also held that Lattin imposed the same hostile and claim of right element
on a public road that is found in private prescriptive easement case law in addition to the statutory
requirements. There is no such requirement within the statute.
Further, Lattin did not superimpose this requirement on the statutory elements of I.C. § 40202(3). This Court found there was insufficient evidence in the record of public use of the road.
Lattin, 149 Idaho at 502-503, 236 P.3d 1257, 1262-1263. This Court also found there was no
evidence in the record regarding maintenance of the road. Id. at 503, 236 P.3d at 1263.
The discussion in Lattin of the presumption of permissive use of a road constructed by the
landowner was dicta. In Regan v. Owen, 163 Idaho 359, 413 P.3d 759 (2010), this Court held
dicta is not binding authority. This discussion was not relevant to this Court’s findings regarding
the statutory elements of a road established pursuant to I.C. § 40-202(3). The district court’s
reliance on this dictum was error.
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E.

The district court’s erred in the entry of the amended final judgment

Finally, even if the district court’s judgment was affirmed on the above issues, the district
court’s second amended judgment contains error. The district court determined the Delavan’s
parcel extended to the edge of asphalt as it exists today based upon its interpretation of the deed.
R p. 64. The edge of asphalt is not the extent of the public road. The public road as it existed
easterly of the Delavan driveway included a shoulder area outside the asphalt section used for
drainage, posting road signs and snow storage. Tr Vol. I, p. 65, L. 22 – p. 66, L. 25; see also
Exhibit III (lower right hand corner). Thus, the district court should have accounted for this
shoulder in the judgment it entered.
V.

CONCLUSION

The district requests the district court’s verdict be reversed and the matter be remanded
for entry of judgment in favor of the District.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 5th day of September, 2018.
JAMES, VERNON & WEEKS, P.A.

Q
Attorneys for Appellant East Side Highway District
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FINDINGS 0F FACT

I.

1.

In 1910, the Lakeshore Addition to Sunnyside Plat

That plat

map

was recorded

in

Kootenai County.

reﬂected a roadway dedicated to the public forever; that roadway

South Boothe Park Road, which since 1956 has provided access

to a boat launch
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Coeur d’Alene.
2.
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l

platted property.

lots

2

— 38.

now

4. Oliver Delavan, grandfather to Defendant Greg Delavan, acquired title to lots 19-22 as
platted in 1945 from Louis Wassmer, for a total of 400 feet of lake frontage .
5. For an unknown reason, there was a problem with the lot numbering as shown on the plat
versus what was possessed on the ground, resulting in Oliver Delavan possessing 100
fewer feet oflake frontage than he possessed title to pursuant to the plat and his deeds.
6. John Boothe, one of the original patties who recorded the plat, conveyed additional
unplatted property lying between lots 18 and 19 as platted to Oliver Delavan in 1949.
This prope1ty was described in the deed as being bounded to the northeast and northwest
by Boothe Park Road as it existed in 1949, along the road, and then along the right of
way line of Boothe Parke Road to the meander line of Lake Coeur d'Alene.
7. Based on the evidence presented, the Court infers that the deed from Boothe to Delavan

was intended to be reparative of the numbering problem and grant Delavan the amount of
lake frontage for which he owned by title. The conveyance of the unplatted lot was
intended to provide 100 feet of lake frontage.
8. Boothe Parke Road as it existed in 1949 did not reach the meander line of Lake Coeur
d'Alene, and did not continue past Oliver Delavan's driveway.

9. The precise course of the road near its terminus as it existed in 1949 is indeterminable.
The majority of Boothe Pru·k today is a wide parking area for the park and boat ran1p.
Thus, the precise course of Boothe Park Road's projected right of way line to Lake Coeur
d'Alene in 1949 cannot be determined.
10. In 1949, there was no boat ramp in existence at the end of Boothe Park Road, and thus no
reason for the road to continue to the Lake.
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line

18.

This fence line was intended
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CONCLUSIONS 0F LAW
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